Daniel Ortega and Populist Authoritarianism in Nicaragua

Daniel Ortega and Populist Authoritarianism in Nicaragua. Daniel Ortega, the aging revolutionary and leader of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN), has proven to be somewhat of an enigma as President of Nicaragua since 2007. He proudly waives his leftist, revolutionary credentials while making deals with conservatives, the Church, opposition business organizations, and the United States (US),at least prior to 2018, and using violence against a growing opposition movement from young, post-revolutionary Nicaraguans and opposition politicians. In my History of Nicaragua (2010), I finish the book cautiously optimistic about the future of democracy in that tragic yet beautiful country. Since that time, “revolutionary” President Ortega has made deals that keep him and his family in power and the country has moved on a more and more populist and authoritarian path, ironically the very reason the FSLN sought to rid the country of the Somoza dynasty during the revolution that brought it to power. So, what happened?

Brief Overview Prior to Ortega’s election in 2006

After coming to power in 1979 Ortega and the revolutionary FSLN ruled Nicaragua throughout the 1980s while facing opposition by former supporters of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the so-called contras, assisted by the US in a violent and bloody civil war. Despite the conflict, Ortega was elected president in 1984. Exhausted politically, economically, physically, and seeking an end to the war, the people of the country voted the FSLN out of power in 1990 in favor of independent Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Conservative and terribly corrupt Arnoldo Aleman was elected president in 1996. In a backlash to the corruption of Aleman, conservative Enrique Jose Bolanos was elected president in 2001. The FSLN, led by Ortega, served as a loyal opposition in the country until his election to the presidency in November 2006. The 1984, 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2006 elections were determined to be free and fair by most outside observers.

There were some indicators that Ortega was seeking his own personal dominance prior to 2006. This was evident both within the governing processes and within the FSLN. Since 1990 Nicaragua has been a multiparty system with no single party able to achieve the minimum percentage of the vote required. United behind a conservative candidate, a coalition of right wing parties was able to win more than the minimally required 45 percent of the vote to claim the presidency in 1996. The FSLN, the largest single party in the country, led by Ortega was not large enough to meet the 45 percent minimum to win the presidency. This led Ortega to make a deal with the corrupt Aleman of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) and some members of the conservative coalition in 1999. Known derisively as “el pacto,” the deal guaranteed a seat in the Congress to Aleman which protected him from legal prosecution and reduced the minimum percentage of the vote necessary to win the presidency from 45 to 35 percent in the first round of voting. This corrupt deal led to the narrow election win by Bolanos among divided conservatives in 2001. By lowering the threshold to 35 percent, “el pacto” paved the way for the election of Ortega and the FSLN in 2006 with only 38% of the vote with the now hopelessly divided, conservative opposition parties. “El pacto” also allowed the Supreme Court and the Supreme Electoral Council to come to be dominated by the FSLN and the PLI.

Within the FSLN, a small, yet vocal opposition to Ortega’s prevailing leadership appeared in the aftermath of the 1990 election. Leading FSLN women (Mirna Cunningham and Dora Maria Tellez) and men (Henry Ruiz, Ernesto and Fernando Cardenal, Victor Hugo Tinoco, Humberto Ortega, Sergio Ramirez, and Luis Carrion) left because of the “lack of internal democracy that blocked criticism to Ortega’s control” (Jeffrey Gould). This small group created the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS, Sandinista Renovation Movement) in February of 1995. The problem faced by the MRS was that attacking the FSLN and Ortega in the general election was similar to opposing the revolution with which they had played such a dominant role. It wasn’t until 2006 that the MRS was able to challenge Ortega and that failed with the untimely death of extremely popular Mayor of Managua and MRS member, Henry Lewites, who stood an excellent chance of winning the presidency.

Ortega, still citing his revolutionary credentials and widely supported by Nicaraguans who benefitted from the revolution, cemented his dominance of FSLN labor unions and their votes through corporatist arrangements (formal patron-client relationships). In the campaign of 2006, Ortega converted to Catholicism and formally married his long-time girlfriend, Rosario Murillo, in the Church. He also reversed FSLN’s pro-abortion rights policy to gain the support of the Catholic Church hierarchy. This was crucial to his election as president in 2006 and it represented a willingness on his part to deviate from FSLN orthodoxy to win the election.

Ortega and Nicaragua since 2007

Ortega and the FSLN government worked out a debt agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He made a deal with the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the major organization representing the private business sector, which essentially said that he would not get in the way of the private sector if the private sector would not get in the way of his social programs. Ortega worked within Dominican Republic Central American US Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and trade with the United States expanded. He created large free trade zones that brought in assembly plants (maquiladoras) from companies in South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and the European Union. This not only provided needed jobs to Nicaraguans but it also increased exports to the United States which earned Ortega support from the business sector and many conservatives. Ortega created agreements between the state, the employers in the free trade zones, and the union federations. Prevailing wages were set across the industries in the free trade zones with increases in wages set by calendar dates. In return there was the promise of no days lost to work stoppages or walk outs by unions (Jonah Walters). Foreign direct investment in the free trade zones increased dramatically during his first term in office. Poverty was reduced significantly due to economic growth coupled with social programs such as free healthcare, free education, and social security. Ortega was able to provide free internet access in many of the public parks. These actions were the primary reason for his growing support and popularity. The country benefitted tremendously from the largesse (oil and grants) of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and current President Nicolas Maduro. This helped to meet the needs of labor and the poor via the massive social programs and to make peace with the conservative business sector of Nicaragua by keeping business taxes very low. To put it simply, Ortega and the FSLN were able to satisfy both the needs of the business sector and the poor in Nicaragua until recently. It should be noted that tourism grew tremendously and Nicaragua was very successful in reducing the gang and drug violence that is so common in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.

Yet, Ortega corrupted the political institutions and processes. By 2012, Ortega and the FSLN controlled the congress, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Electoral Council. In 2014 Ortega and the FSLN eliminated the term limits for the presidency and the 35 percent of the vote requirement to win the presidency in the first round. A simply plurality now wins the presidency. With a divided opposition, this makes Ortega and the FSLN very difficult to defeat in a presidential election. The president was given the ability to appoint his own high ranking military officers and to appoint active duty military officers to civilian positions in the government. The president was also given direct control over the police forces of the country. This politicization of the military and the police serves to consolidate Ortega’s control over any matters interpreted as national security.

The FSLN changed the constitution by limiting the right of the press to “constructive” criticism. While an opposition press still exists, this made it difficult for journalists to openly be critical of the Ortega government. It is clear that the government engages in efforts to obstruct and discredit journalists who report negatively about its activities. Journalists are sometimes targeted in opposition demonstrations by pro-FSLN groups and the police fail to protect them.

Many observers questioned the legitimacy of the 2011 national elections, which Ortega won with nearly 63 percent of the vote (official government data). Almost all conceded that Ortega, who was extremely popular among poor Nicaraguans and FSLN led labor unions, most likely would have won even without carrying out fraud (Freedom House). The 2016 presidential election was much more controversial. Prior to the election, the FSLN dominated Supreme Court removed popular PLI leader, Eduardo Montealegre, as the presidential candidate of the PLI led opposition coalition. Instead, it installed Pedro Reyes, the leader of a smaller party, as the coalition’s candidate. The court then removed the members of the PLI and MRS in the congress who opposed and rejected Reyes as their candidate. While Ortega won in 2016 officially with 72 percent of the vote, opposition leaders considered it a “farce.” Several opposition parties boycotted the election and international observers were not allowed in the country. Just as controversial was that Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo, was now the country’s Vice-President. Despite the consolidation of Ortega’s power over the governing institutions and processes and the questions over the 2016 election, Ortega remained extremely popular until 2018. The opposition to Ortega and the FSLN remained weak and divided.

Recent Events and the 2021 Presidential Election

In April of 2018 demonstrations broke out in the major cities largely led by young Nicaraguans from the universities. Ironically, many of these students were from families that had helped bring the FSLN to power. The immediate causes were a reaction to the government’s handling of the forest fires in the important Indio Maiz Biological Reserve, a lowland rainforest preserve in the southeast, and government reforms of social security. While the government sent troops and helicopters to the reserve, it simply could not contain the fires. More importantly, due to declining support from Venezuela, which was in economic collapse, and declining economic revenues coupled with a decline in tourism, Ortega, COSEP, other business leaders, and the IMF worked out a plan that would cut social security benefits sharply while raising taxes on businesses, workers, and retirees. Ortega rejected the plan and put into place a program that cut benefits to a much less degree but still raised taxes on businesses, workers, and retirees. Nonetheless, the proposed cuts in social security were met with street protests. The police responded to the protests with violence. Ultimately the social security changes were withdrawn but the government repression of the demonstrations led to calls for Ortega’s resignation and the mobilization of more opposition groups.

Demonstrations in the major cities continued throughout the summer and early fall representing a backlash to Ortega and the FSLN’s dominance of the political processes. The demonstrations allowed Ortega to pass laws that restricted opposition to the government (protests and the media) despite condemnation from the international community and the Trump administration. Negotiations between Ortega and the Church and opposition leaders eventually brought about an uneasy peace by the summer of 2019 while at least 400 demonstrators had been killed, thousands wounded, and hundreds arrested and detained by the government. Some of the opposition leaders fled the country and sporadic unrest continues today.

With the presidential election coming up in November of this year, Ortega has recently moved against the opposition and opposition candidates. This represents an escalation of the repression because it is now directed at political elites. As of June 13, he had detained at least 13 opposition leaders including several candidates for the presidency including Cristiana Chamorro Barrios, considered by many with the best chance of defeating Ortega. She is the daughter of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro who defeated Ortega in the 1990 election. Other presidential candidates detained include long-time FSLN opposition leader and businessman Arturo Cruz and Juan Sebastian Chamorro Garcia, a cousin of Cristiana Chamorro Barrios. Tamara Davila of the Blue and White National Unity coalition was also detained.

Ortega has turned against several of his fellow revolutionaries who are the leaders of the Democratic Renovation Union (UNAMOS), which is the new name of the MRS. Those detained include Victor Hugo Tinoco, Hugo Torres, and Dora Maria Tellez who had fought side-by-side with Ortega against the Somoza dynasty. In fact, it was Torres that had arranged a deal to get Ortega released from a Somoza jail in 1974. Other UNAMOS leaders detained included Suyen Barahona and Ana Margarita Vijil. All were detained and will be charged with national security violations for activities “against the independence, sovereignty, and auto-determination of the country.” Opposition will likely increase over the next few months but the opposition is still very much divided which works to Ortega’s favor.

It remains to be seen what will happen but my cautious optimism with the publication of my book in 2010 has not been borne out. Danielismo or populist authoritarianism rules in Nicaragua.

Note: This essay is based on my own knowledge of the country and contacts in Managua and Granada; articles from the US State Department, Economic Intelligence Unit, Reuters, the BBC, NY Times, the Word Bank, Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the Congressional Research Service; the reading of several Nicaraguan newspapers including La Prensa; the speeches of Sergio Ramirez; and several scholarly articles (Jonah Walters, James Phillips, Luis Galeano, Jeffrey Gould). Any mistaken facts are mine.